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Notes on Building State Capability

Building State Capability
Evidence, Analysis, Action
Matt Andrews, Lant Pritchett, and
Michael Woolcock
Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs),
p.12
2 See Chong et al. (2014).
Chong, A., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., and Shleifer, A. 2014. Letter grading
government efficiency. Journal of the European Economic Association 12(2), pp. 277–99.
p.28
Our theory stems from our belief that success builds capability, and not vice versa. Institutions and organizations and state capability are the result of success—they are the consolidation and reification of successful practices.
p.31
We refer to this combination of capability failure while maintaining at least the appearance and often the legitimacy and benefits of capability as “successful failure.”
In this chapter we argue isomorphic mimicry is a key “technique of successful failure” that perpetuates capability traps in development (Pritchett et al.2013).
Isomorphic mimicry conflates form and function: “looks like” substitutes for “does.”
p.32
This leads to “institutional monocropping” (Evans 2004).
Evans, P. 2004. Development as institutional change: The pitfalls of monocropping and the potentials of deliberation. Studies in Comparative International Development
38(4), pp. 30–52.
p.34
Note that the actions of organizations, leadership, and front-line workers work best if they are coherent.
p.39
As the adage goes, if an organization has more than three goals it has no goals.
p.43
Leaders of the organizations can
further their own careers by signing off on such interventions. Their agreement
to adopt externally mandated reforms facilitates the continued flow of
external funds, which can further various public and private interests. Frontline
workers ostensibly required to implement these changes are seldom part
of the conversation about change, however, and thus have no incentive (or
opportunity) to contribute ideas about how things could be improved.
These local agents have every incentive to
treat reforms as signals, adopting external solutions that are not necessarily
politically accepted or practically possible in the local context. Local agents
have little incentive to pursue improved functionality in such settings, especially
when they are rewarded so handsomely for complying with externally
mandated “forms” (appearances).
p.46
A consequence of believing that form drives function is that it permits—
even creates an imperative for—transplanting “best practices” from one context
to another.
p.47
The first reason is that it is the process of arriving at state capability, not the
form, which matters for sustained functional success.
<コメント>
なぜ上記を書きつけたかというと、今これを読んでいるから。簡単に言えば、世界の開発/発展がうまくいってないのは、関係者が「型(forms)」ばっかりにこだわっているから、という。
http://bsc.cid.harvard.edu/building-state-capability...
この「世の中は型ばかりで内実が伴っていない」という主張は重要で、これによって勘三郎18の型大事主義(もうちょっと良い名前が出てきたら代えます)を批判できる可能性がある。英語ではKabuki playという言葉は「大げさで中身のない見かけだけの催し物」という意味で使われるが、中身の無さというニュアンスで上記と通じるものがある。
歌舞伎側から言えば、もちろん、玉三郎発言の「型じゃないよ気持ちだよ。気持ちじゃないよ型だよ」を想起すれば、型と気持ち(魂)が同時追走並走で進むことが重要との指摘によって芸の継承は担保されている。ここでは「気持ち」を大事にした近代的な歌右衛門6とも関わりがあるだろう。そして、歌右衛門6は勘三郎18に教えている。
以前に放映された中村屋ドキュメンタリーで、たしか平成中村座の楽屋で勘三郎18が勘九郎(当時はまだ勘太郎だったはず)に型を教えている風景が思い出される。これは見ようによっては奇妙な光景で、勘三郎18は勘太郎に対して、お前は気持ちを入れ過ぎているとたしなめ、ちょっと見てみろと、自分で演技をしてみせ、この時に自分は今日の夜ごはんは何かなぁと考えていたのだと明かす。つまり、気持ちを入れずに型を見せるのだ。本当はこんなことしちゃいけないよと言いながら、型の重要性を息子に熱心に説く勘三郎18は何を言おうとしていたのだろうか。
思い出すのは、勘三郎18が父の勘三郎17について言っていた言葉だ。「父は芝居を投げる時がありますが、僕は芝居を投げることはありません。」どうやって投げずに済むのか、そこが勘三郎18にとっての型という工夫なのかもしれない。つまり、正しい型を身につければ、型によって自ずと気持ちが刺激されるのだろう。正しい型を修得することは、そこで止まるのではなく、さらに魂を刺激することに意味があるのだろう。
Building State Capability(BSC)で言えば、歌舞伎を環境の異なる場所、地歌舞伎や子供歌舞伎、極端に言えば外国で教える時にどうなのか、ということになる。BSCはこう言っている。What we are arguing is that the process of transplantation of the forms is a counterproductive approach to achieving
high capability. The first reason is that it is the process of arriving at state capability, not the form, which matters for sustained functional success. (p.4
p.49
Shared purpose is an organization’s immune system. Organizations born
through transplantation that did not have to struggle their way into existence
defending their legitimacy on the basis of functionality are creatures without
an immune system.
<コメント>
shared purposeをもった「人」が重要なのだろう。
それが免疫系になる。
p.51
But even if that
organization proves locally successful, closed spaces for organizational innovation
may lead to a brief localized success but with no scalable impact on the
system.
Put differently, “modernization” is an
ongoing process of discovering and encouraging which of the diverse array of
context-specific institutional forms will lead to higher functionality.
we argue that it is the broader fitness environment of this ecology for
its constituent elements that primarily shapes observed outcomes.
p.54
The often twinned forces of isomorphic mimicry and premature load bearing
can leave countries stuck in capability traps in spite of well-meaning conscious
efforts to accelerate modernization by both domestic actors (“reform champions”)
and external development agencies.
p.55
First, there is an implicit
assumption that the country is a “blank slate” with no pre-existing state
capability, or such weak capability that it can be easily replaced or subsumed.
Second, there is the expectation that function will follow form, quickly. Third,
the actions of the international development community are based on the
same theory of change that has become familiar thus far in the book: namely,
their actions are based on the transplantation of best practices with little
regard to the actual capability of the organizations charged with implementing
it.
p.57
Collecting tax is one such example: it requires both a capable state and an
acceptance by the population that this is a legitimate role of the state. The
now-wealthy countries built this capability slowly, but developing countries
are expected to quickly acquire the capability to conduct this task, despite the
fact that such tasks are complex and often contentious.
p.74
To the extent that state capability completely (or nearly) collapsed (as in Liberia or Afghanistan or DRC or Somalia or Haiti) or had been sharply retrogressing from moderate levels (as the data on “Quality of Government” suggest of Pakistan or Kenya or Venezuela) or is merely stuck at a low rate of either retrogression or progression (or a mix) or a moderate level of capacity (as appears to be the case in, say, India), these are all “second jump” situations.
p.79
In our working definition a “policy” has four elements: a formula that maps from actions to facts, processes for determining the policy-relevant facts, a set of objectives, and a causal model.
p.83
Organizations with weak capability for policy implementation are those that cannot equip their agents with the capacity, resources, and motivation to take actions that promote the organization’s stated objectives.
p.104
1. Transactionintensive?
p.105
2. Discretionary?
p.106
3. Service or obligation?
p.107
4. Based on known technology?
p.108
Figure 5.1
Four key analytic questions about an activity to classify the capability needed
p.109
Figure 5.2. The five types of activities that have different capability needs in implementation
p.113
However, for a variety of historical, political, and intellectual reasons primaryeducation came to be dominated by “spider”9 organizations which approached public education as a logistical problem of expanding enrollments.
Accounting and Accounts in Accountability
p.114
An “account” is the justificatory narrative I tell myself which reconciles my actions with my identity: am I fulfilling my duties?
[コメント]
これが玉三郎の言う「気持ち」ってこと。気持ちがなければ型もない。
Our argument is that successful organizations rely on a combination of thin and thick accountability, both internally and externally.
As we saw in Chapter4, when accounts and accounting diverge, organizations can often “fix” the accounting and thereby make the “administrative facts” of accounting a complete fiction.
Our argument is that successful organizations are built on internal and external accounts for which accounting provides some support and plays some role.
p.115
These organizations survive and thrive because key agents believe it is important that their account of what they do (indeed perhaps who they are) accords with the purposes of the organization.
p.116
When attempts at thin accountability—making agent rewards depend on judicable“facts”(likeattendance,likewereactualtaxesowed)—areimpossible becausethe overallinstitutionalenvironment isweak, thenevenusing incentives will not work.
Besley, T. and McLaren, J. 1993. Taxes and bribery: The role of wage incentives. Economic Journal 103(416), pp. 119–41.
Besley and Ghatak (2005) explore this issue referring to organizations with “mission” (what we call internal folk culture of performance) and show that if organizations can be matched to mission then this non-pecuniary form of motivation reduces the need for (if not desirability of) high-powered pecuniary incentives. The better organizations are able to recruit individuals motivatedbymission(individualswhosepersonalthickaccountabilityisstrong)the less the organization needs to rely on thin accountability.
Besley, T. and Ghatak, M. 2005. Competition and incentives with motivated agents. American Economic Review 95(3), pp. 616–36.
p.123
We start with a simple classroom exercise to do this, focused on designing a strategy to travel from east to west in the United States of America in 2015 and 1804.
p.126
Table 6.2. A strategy to Go West in 2015
They do so by answering four questions: What drives action? How is action identified and carried out? What authority or leadership is required? and, Who needs to be involved? Table6.2 shows the common responses to each question. These show, essentially, that action will be driven by a predefined solution, which is identified with reference to existing knowledge and experience, planned out in detail and implemented as planned.
p.129
Table 6.3. A strategy to Go West in 1804
p.130
Table6.3 summarizes the common answers, which suggest, for instance, that the action needs to be driven by a highly motivating problem that is felt and owned by those involved. Action cannot be predefined but must rather emerge through experimental iterations where teamstakeastep,learn,adapt,and take another step.
p.131
First, there are different capability building challenges in the world.
Second,differentstrategiesareneededtoaddressthedifferentchallenges.
Whereas these observations arise from a basic exercise, we find much food for thought when reflecting on the challenge of building state capability in development. These manifest in two questions: (1) Do efforts to build state capability involve 2015 or 1804 challenges, or a blend of both? and (2) Do 2015 or 1804 strategies work better when trying to build real state capability for implementation?
p.132
The studyfoundthatevery singlecaseinvolvedablendofchallenges, some resembling going west in 2015 (being logistical) and others resembling going west in 1804 (being wicked hard, or complex).
[コメント]
logisticsとその他の対比が重要。我々はlogisticsについてかなり進化しているという。問題は、問題がlogisticsなのかどうか。
p.133
For instance, education projects commonly include some school building initiatives, whicharelargelylogistical(and hence2015innature)butalsoinclude efforts to improve teacher and student performance in the schools that have been built (which resemble 1804 challenges).
[コメント]病院は造ったはいいが、使われなければ仕方がない。
Interestingly, all of the cases received points for having both types of strategy in place, suggesting a blended approach to building state capability. However, as Table6.4 indicates, evidence also shows that the successful initiatives exhibited more of an 1804 strategy than a 2015 one.
p.135
The first, SLDC, stands for solution and leader-driven change. Thisis wherean intervention emerges froma fixed solution, is implemented through a well-developed and disciplined plan, and led by a highly authorized individual working with a small group of experts. The second, PDIA, is the approach that we find most relevant in addressing complex, wicked hard challenges commonly involved in building state capability.
PDIA is a process strategy that does not rely on blueprints and known solutions as the key to building state capability. In contrast, PDIA combines four key principles of engagement into a way of thinking about and doing development work in the face of complexity: (1) Focus on specific problems in particular local contexts, as nominated and prioritized by local actors; (2) Foster active, ongoing experimental iterations with new ideas, gathering lessons from these iterations to turn ideas into solutions; (3) Establish an “authorizing environment” for decision-making that encourages experimentation and “positive deviance”; and (4) Engage broad sets of agents to ensure that reforms are viable, legitimate, and relevant—that is, politically supportable and practically implementable.
“good-enough governance” (Grindle 2004)
p.136
Examples include design thinking, rapid results implementation modalities, agile policymaking, the use of problem trees and Ishikawa or fishbone diagrams in problem analysis, problem-driven political economy diagnostics, double-loop learning methods, and more.
[コメント]
デザイン思考も入っている。
[コメント]
ハイチ南東県ジャクメル市で病院の新棟を建設することは、2015戦略により2015挑戦である。これに対して、ジャクメル病院の新棟を運営することは1804戦略を必要とする1804挑戦である。
p.140
problem-driven vs. solution-driven
p.142
Indeed, we find that many reformers claiming to be problem-driven are in fact not problem-driven at all.
[コメント]
problemをどのように見つけるかが重要。solutionの欠如として位置付けてはいけない。
p.143
focal problem needs to reflect on a performance deficiency
パフォーマンス不足に注目しないといけない
腰痛と似ている。条件だと思っているうちはダメ。
The construction process involves raising the visibility of persistent weaknesses through spectacular “focusing events” like crises, the use of statistical indicators, or manipulation of feedback from previous experiences. This is the first step in doing PDIA: Constructing problems out of conditions, drawing attention to the need for change and bringing such change onto the social, political, and administrative agenda.
p.149
Table 7.1. Constructing a problem out of your 1804 challenge
p.150
We propose using tools like the “5-why technique” and fishbone diagrams in such deconstruction.
[コメント]
表7.1を使って、問題を構築し、そのあと魚骨ダイアグラムを使って脱構築する。
トヨタ方式!
図7.1 石川ダイアグラム
表7.1と図7.1を組み合わせて理解すること!
p.153
bring new agents into a fledgling team that included members from a variety of affected agencies.
脱構築のプロセスで、メンバーを関係機関から巻き込んでいくこと。
p.154
We find this kind of problem deconstruction both illuminating and empowering. It forces would-be reformers and policymakers to interrogate the problem that they often think they fully understand.
p.158
We simplify the observations from such work into a heuristic that reformers can use in assessing “space for change” in any causal dimension area.
The heuristic points to three key factors influencing the opportunity for change, authority, acceptance, and ability (triple-A factors) (Andrews 2008; Andrews etal. 2010):
p.170
The hallmarks of this process are simple: targeted actions are rapidly tried, lessons are quickly gathered to inform what happened and why, and a next action step is designed and undertaken based on what was learned in prior steps.
This approach is quite different to the conventional way state capability initiatives are structured, in which specialists initially conduct studies to decide on a “solution,” then design how the solution should be introduced into a context, and then initiate implementation.
p.172
Figure 8.1. The design space: where do we get ideas from?
p.173
latent practice: Rapid Results type interventions
p.174
For example, in every town with high levels of infant mortality, one can identify a household where no children die; they are the positive deviants, doing something that others are not doing but that is effective in addressing the problem in the context.
p.177
The message here is simple: finding and fitting solutions to complex problems requires first identifying multiple ideas and then trying these out, in an experimentalmanner,toallowtheemergenceofhybrids.
p.178
A different approach is required when dealing with complex challenges— wherepolicymakersandwould-bereformerscantrynewideasout,learnwhat works and why, adapt ideas, and repeat the process until a solution is found. We call this experimental iteration.
p.179
.The approach should not be confused with a randomized controlled trial, however,whereonetestsanideainascientificmanner,randomizingwhoreceives the “treatment” and attempting to control the messy influences of reality.
[コメント]
ランダマイズとは違います。
p.180
Figure 8.2. The iterative process in simple form
p.184
The Searchframe, unlike a Logframe, does not specify every action step that will be taken.
p.185
Figure8.3.The“Searchframe”as a Logframe alternative for complex challenges
p.189
Experientiallearninglikethis(whichmightalsobecalled“actionlearning”) is the process of learning through experience, or by doing. It involves the learner actively in a process of trying something and then reflecting on experience, where the learner is both source and user of emergent knowledge;
p.191
Table 8.3. Fostering experiential learning in your find-and-fit process
p.199
This is a demanding list, but it is perhaps not as demanding as the key elements one actually needs to tackle complex challenges, when experimentingtofindandfitnewsolutions:“flexibility”and“shareability”and “grit” (or patience)—as noted above—from those providing authorization (where the last characteristic relates to the ability of an authorizer to manage waiting periods, failure, and changes in direction, given a passion for attaining the long-term goal).
p.204
Figure 9.2. The reality: fragmented and dysfunctional authorization mechanisms
p.206
Table 9.2. Where will you look for your authorization needs?
Table 9.3. Assumptions about our authorizing environment complexity (see Figure 9.2)
p.207
The first point to make is simply that you should treat all your assumptions about authority with the same degree of healthy skepticism.
The second point is that you need a concerted strategy in place to gain the authority you need from authorizers, and communication is at the heart of this process.
p.208
The third point is that you do not require full authority at the start of your initiative.
p.211
The final point we would like to make about gaining and growing authority centers on the use of coalitions in PDIA.
p.213
Table 9.5. Questions to ask about gaining and growing authority
p.218
One needs gradual 4-D scaling in such situations—where capability expands in all four ways; quantitative (“more” entities are affected), functional (“more” activities are performed), political (“more” support is attracted, and mandates are broadened), and organizational (“more” resources are allocated to areas of growing capability)—with organizations learning more things and achievingmorepoliticalspacetomoveandusenewcapability.
p.222
The importance of broad and deep engagement should be obvious, even from these overly simplistic and stylized figures.
p.223
As in the example presented above (in Figures10.1 and 10.2), a broad engagement is one in which many people provide real and different leadership roles from many different places in the social or state structure.
p.227
She identifies three approaches to mobilize these “resources”: leveraging, convening,andaccumulating.Weoftenemploytheseapproacheswhenmobilizing agents for PDIA processes, with a fourth we call connecting.
p.230
Table 10.3. Which mobilization mechanism/strategy best fits your situation?
We like to think of these challenges as adventures or expeditions into the unknown— much like the 1804 Lewis and Clark expedition discussed in Chapter6.
Make sure that you do not identify yourself as playing more than three roles, please—this is our rule-of-thumb limit to the number of roles any one person should play in any given effort to build state capability.

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