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Daron Acemoglu, The Crisis of 2008: Structural Lessons for and from Economics 日本語

The same economic and …financial changes that have made our economy
more diversifi…ed and individuals …firms better insured have also increased the
interconnections among them. Since the only way diversi…fication of idiosyn-
cratic risks can happen is by sharing these risks among many companies and
individuals, better diversi…fication also creates a multitude of counter-party
relationships. Such interconnections make the economic system more robust
against small shocks because new …nancial products successfully diversify a
wide range of idiosyncratic risks and reduce business failures
. But they also
make the economy more vulnerable to certain low-probability, "tail" events
precisely because the interconnections that are an inevitable precipitate of
the greater diversi…fication create potential domino effects among …financial in-stitutions, companies and households. (p.3)


A more in-depth study of aggregate volatility also necessitates con-
ceptual and theoretical investigations of how the increasingly interconnected
nature of our economic and …financial system affects the allocation of resources
and the allocation and sharing of risks of both companies and individuals. (p.4)

そうなんだ、リカルド・ハウスマンが90年代末にvolatility, volatilityと言っていたときに、ただの「どマクロ」でさえなかったので興味が持てなかった。しかし、こちらの度量も格別に小さかったということなんだろうな。ヤレヤレ。

A deep and important contribution of the discipline of economics is the insight that greed is neither good nor bad in the abstract. When channeled into pro…t-maximizing, competitive and innovative behavior under the auspices of sound laws and regulations, greed can act as the engine of innovation and economic growth. But when unchecked by the appropriate institutions and regulations, it will degenerate into rent-seeking, corruption and crime. (p.5)


Our faith in long-lived large organizations was shaken but still standing after
the accounting scandals in Enron and other giants of the early 2000s. It may
now have suffered the death blow. (p.6)

reputational capitalつまりブランドのことです。

Whenever the incentives to compromise integrity, to sacri…fice the quality, and to take unnecessary risks are there, most companies will do so in tandem. And because the ex post vacuum of speci…fic skills, capital and knowledge that their punishment will create make such a course of action too costly for the society, all kinds of punishments lose their effectiveness and credibility. (p.6)

日本の政治家が適当にやれるのも、誰も政治家になりたくないから?specific capitalの欠如?

The lessons for our thinking from this chain of reasoning are twofold.
First, we need to rethink the role of the reputations of …firms in market trans-actions taking the general equilibrium--- the scarcity value of their skills and expertise when reputations of several of them fail simultaneously--- into ac-count. (p.6)


Second, we need to revisit the key questions of the economics of orga-
nization so that …firm reputations should be derived from the behavior--- and
interactions--- of directors, managers and employees, rather than from that
of the hypothetical principal maximizing the net present discounted value of
the …firm. (p.7)


Such volatility, perhaps strengthened now more than ever
because of the greater global interconnections, is not a curse against which
we should defend ourselves, but for the most part an opportunity for the market economy. By reallocating resources to where productivity and demand are, the capitalist system can exploit volatility. (p.9)

これはrelative price changeのことでしょうか。

Market signals suggest that labor and capital should be reallocated away from the Detroit Big Three and highly skilled labor should be reallocated away from the …financial industry towards more innovative sectors. The latter reallocation is critically important in view of the fact that the Wall Street attracted many of the best (and most ambitious) minds over the past two decades and we now realize that though these bright young minds have contributed to …financial innovation, they also used their talents for devising new methods of taking large risks, the downside of which they would not bear. Halted reallocation will also mean halted innovation. (p.11)

たとえば、Wall Streetの若いのが、Dellに入る。DellはManufacturingだけど、ほとんど米国内では作ってない。ただし、所得収支が増加するので貿易収支ではなく、経常収支で見れば大丈夫、そういう話かな。

The risk that we face is one of an "expectational trap"--- consumers and policymakers becoming pessimistic about future growth and the promise of markets. (p.11)

PKのDiminished Expectationを考えればいいのかな。

A comprehensive stimulus plan, even with all of its imperfections, is prob-
ably the best way of …fighting off these dangers, and on balance, there are
sufficient reasons for academic economists as well as concerned citizens to
support current e¤orts as insurance against the worst outcomes we may face.
Nevertheless, the details of the stimulus plan should be designed so as to
cause minimal disruption to the process of reallocation and innovation. Sac-
ri…cing growth out of our fear of the present would be as severe a mistake as
inaction. (p.12)

Both devils and angels live in details.というところでしょうか。長期的な成長を考えろ、ということですね。


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Posted by: いなば | 2009.01.10 at 01:06 PM

いなばさま、コメントありがとうございました。アセモグルが言いたいことは、仰るとおりだと私も思います。逆に、このポストで「こういう風に使うんでしょうか」と書いて自分へのメモとしたのは、「こういう風」とは「アセモグル風」のことです。日本の1991-2002を説明するのにdisorganizationのようなことではなく、アセモグル風に考えればよいのではないかというmemo to selfでした。
 ここからは放談です。つまり、comparative economics (Simon Johnson) - Masahiko Aoki - O. Williamson風に繋げて、institutionとorganizationが渾然一体となったソ連、institutionとorganizationがより明確に分かれる米国、その中間にある日本と強引に整理してみると、日本へのアプローチはdisorganization風とアセモグル風と両方あるように思います。

Posted by: ひさまつ | 2009.01.10 at 01:27 PM


Posted by: いなば | 2009.01.11 at 01:33 AM

あと、creative destruction and reallocationの話ですが、アセモグルもカバレロ同様に(彼への謝辞がありますね)、「創造的破壊と資源再配分は不況期にはうまくいかない」と考えているのでしょうか? ここには明確には述べられていないような。

Posted by: いなば | 2009.01.11 at 01:43 AM

 わかっていることは、米国の国際収支の状況から見て、中期的には貿易財部門に資源が再配分される必要があるということです。為替も切下がるでしょう。そういう過程で、米国の企業をどう考えるか、資源を載せる単なる器として考えるか、やはり、企業には(reputational capital以外の)intangibleな資源が豊富に存在すると考えるか、まさに「組織の経済学」の腕の見せ所だと思います。

Posted by: ひさまつ | 2009.01.11 at 08:54 AM

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Posted by: amazon.com | 2014.09.12 at 04:54 PM

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